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Abstract
In this paper, an IT artifact instantiation (i.e. software prototype) to support decision
making in the field of financial market surveillance, is presented and evaluated. This
artifact utilizes a qualitative multi-attribute model to identify situations in which prices
of single stocks are affected by fraudsters who aggressively advertise the stock. A
quantitative evaluation of the instantiated IT artifact, based on voluminous and
heterogeneous data including data from social media, is provided. The empirical results
indicate that the developed IT artifact instantiation can provide support for identifying
such malicious situations. Given this evidence, it can be shown that the developed
solution is able to utilize massive and heterogeneous data, including user-generated
content from financial blogs and news platforms, to provide practical decision support
in the field of market surveillance.
Keywords: Big Data, User-Generated Content, Decision Support Systems

1 Introduction
Financial market manipulation has received much attention from regulatory authorities,
resulting in trading suspensions of those companies that may have been hijacked by
fraudsters. Recent suspensions included two large groups of penny stock companies
suspended by the U.S. regulatory authority on a single day (SEC, 2012) before they
could harm investors. All companies have been traded on over-the-counter (OTC)
markets with low regulatory standards. For the assessment of potentially affected
companies, the supervisory authority used information technology to recognize thinly
16

Irina Alić

traded, low-capitalization stocks that could be affected by fraudsters. The system is
calibrated to detect companies with low-priced penny stocks that are traded in low
volumes or not at all; such companies must also be delinquent in their public disclosures
(SEC, 2012). Unfortunately, the system reveals its weak point: namely, insufficient realtime surveillance on voluminous and heterogeneous data.
The pump-and-dump manipulation scheme is the most common form of informationbased market manipulation in financial markets (Dunham, 2007; Zaki, 2013). It first
appears as the spreading of false positive information to market participants by
fraudsters; this information, typically user-generated content (UGC) on financial blogs
and news platforms, is enthusiastically spread by fraudsters attempting to pump up a
stock price to an artificial level. Usually, the affected stocks are penny stocks that trade
below $5. Before starting the manipulation, fraudsters buy a significant quantity of the
stocks over a longer period of time. Motivated by spread positive information,
uninformed market participants relying on the bogus story buy the stocks, effectively
forcing abnormal price increases (pump) (Bouraoui, 2009; Huang & Cheng, 2013).
Finally, fraudsters make a profit by selling their stocks at the increased price level,
which accordingly causes the stock price to drop (dump).
This paper addresses the question of whether the assessment of user-generated content
has the potential to help regulatory authorities and financial institutions detect such
situations. Therefore, the focus of this study is to present a quantitative evaluation of the
final IT artifact that has been developed within a major EU project in order to
demonstrate the feasibility of the approach. Accordingly, an evaluation based on a
voluminous dataset is performed; for this purpose, OTC trading data and corresponding
UGC related to 1700 companies were collected during 2012 and 2013. The collected
data is used by the developed and instantiated IT artifact to identify situations of
abusive behavior, and to assess whether those identified situations do actually demand
more attention compared to those that were not identified by be suspicious.
At this point, it is important to note, that the EU project involved several activities in
order to provide services including technologies development as well as the
development of data mining algorithms suitable to handle big data complexity and
provide metadata for further usage for the different use cases. The corresponding
development processes and associated findings resulted in more than 20 research
articles and project deliverables (“Project FIRST,” 2013). Thus, in this present paper,
the voluminous data utilized for this evaluation is provided by the mentioned services.
In the next section, related background research is introduced. Next, I provide an
overview of the developed IT artifact instantiation. Section 4 describes the quantitative
evaluation based on real data, and the final section concludes this paper.
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2 Background
Relevant areas of study relating to this research in terms of stock fraud detection include
literature on (1) stock touting impacts based on spam mails; (2) the impact of usergenerated news on stock activity; and (3) financial markets services architecture. Each
area will be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
Several studies examine of the impact of stock touting using spam emails. To generate
profit, scammers spread misleading information. Authors (Frieder & Zittrain, 2008)
investigate market activity prior to and following a stock touting email campaign,
making use of a dataset containing about 75,000 spam emails. The research reveals high
market activity beginning one day before email spamming commences and continuing
until the day with the most considerable number of touting mails. The authors find that
volume and return respond positively to touting, whereas the returns dip significantly
following the conclusion of the campaign. Hence, the study suggests two main
indicators for market manipulation: abnormal price changes and trading volumes, which
will utilized by our IT artifact. Research conducted by (Bouraoui, 2009) demonstrates
similar findings. The author provides an evolution model of volatility to assess the
impact of stock spam emails based on a sample of 110 penny stock companies. The
research shows abnormal returns three days after the commencement of spam emails. In
both studies, the outcomes have been explained as the behavioral effect of market
participants who have responded positively to the touting. Thus, these studies consider
statistical approaches to explicate the influence of email stock promotion. Other studies
introduce data mining techniques that help identify stock touting spam emails. Research
by (Zaki, Theodoulidis, & Solis, 2011) observes spam massages to detect highly
fraudulent stock activities by utilizing data mining techniques to identify stock touting
spam emails. The accuracy detection of these experiments ranges from 58% to 71%. A
considerable amount of research on the predictive power of UGC (such as tweets,
financial forums, and blogs) on stock prices has been documented in the literature. In
one instance, the research (Delort, Arunasalam, Leung, & Milosavljevic, 2011)
introduce evidence of manipulation and examine the effect of such misuse in online
financial forums. The authors show that manipulative user-generated content regarding
companies with lower prices and market capitalization positively correlates to stock
returns, volatility, and volume. One recent study (Smailović, Grčar, Lavrač, &
Žnidaršič, 2013) presents a support vector, machine-based, sentiment classifier; here, a
set of about 150,000 tweets thematizing eight companies (e.g., Apple, Google, and
Microsoft) served as the data basis. The authors find that positive sentiment predicts
positive movement in the closing price. A study proposed by (Zhang & Skiena, 2010)
examines the ways in which blog and news data is reflected in trading volumes and
returns. The authors demonstrate a significant positive correlation between media
content and trading volume as well as stock returns. Therefore, in this study the UGC
data will be incorporated.
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Several commercial stock market systems for monitoring and detecting abuse in
structured and unstructured data exist; some, such as the Securities Observation, News
Analysis and Regulation Systems (SONAR), are presented in scientific research
(Goldberg, Kirkland, Lee, Shyr, & Thakker, 2003). SONAR, which aims to monitor the
stock market, applies data mining, text mining, statistical regression, and rule-based
detection to recognize both abuse patterns in structured data and unusual trading
following publication of the news. A study by (Mangkorntong & Rabhi, 2008)
compares two different surveillance systems as event-processing systems in such areas
as memory usage, scalability, and flexibility. The authors reveal the strengths and
weaknesses of the two systems and suggest a generic approach that uses numerous
different event-processing systems to support the detection process (Mangkorntong &
Rabhi, 2007).
The next section introduces the Financial Market Surveillance Decision Support System
(FMS-DSS), which was developed within an EU project between 2010 and 2013
(“Project FIRST,” 2013). As an IT artifact instantiation it demonstrates how regulatory
authority can be supported in detecting malicious pump-and-dump market
manipulations utilizing voluminous and heterogeneous data streams.

3 Instantiated IT Artifact
During the research project, the opportunity to develop an instantiated IT artifact (FMSDSS) was provided. Within the research consortium consisting of research institutions,
industry partners, and financial regulatory authority, software components have been
developed in close researcher-practitioner collaboration. The problem owner (i.e.,
domain experts and regulatory authority) intervened according to the project needs and
aligned the design principles with their surveillance issues (Alić, Siering & Bohanec
2013).
Generally, decision support system configurations are built on the basis of three basic
technology components related to: (1) data, (2) models, and (3) user interface (UI)
(Turban, Sharda, & Delen, 2010). The following subsections will present these
components. The data management component preprocesses and stores the needed data.
The model component assesses whether or not given stock are suspicious of being
currently affected by pump-and-dump manipulation schemes. The user interface
component allows meaningful representation of suspicious situations. During operation,
FMS-DSS continuously searches for the appearance of user-generated content related to
monitored companies. For this purpose, unstructured input data is continuously
retrieved, preprocessed, and stored in a database.
Based on rules and models that were developed in close collaboration with the domain
experts that were involved in the project, the UI shows alerts, indicating assessments of
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how likely a stock is affected by manipulation (ranging from very high, high, medium,
low, to very low).

3.1 Data
Selection of potential input data categories based on pump-and-dump manipulation
scheme evidence: In meetings with experts (i.e., compliance officers and the regulatory
body), the specific decision problem in revealing typical factors for pump-and-dump
market manipulation was explained. The three main types of information incorporated
into the decision model are: the manipulation of information concerning the company,
the manipulation of the financial instrument, and news as user-generated content about
the company and its financial instrument. Consequentially, the three main input data
categories of market abuse suspiciousness are Company, Financial Instrument, and
News:


Company: According to the experts, there are two determiners for company
suspiciousness. First, in those cases where the company is already involved in
financial market manipulation, the financial authority issues litigation releases and
puts the company on a blacklist, which is later refined into company, country, and
industry blacklists.

The second determiner of a company’s reliability is its history; the manipulator often
targets newer companies and companies that have gone bankrupt and have recovered
again. The History attribute is thus refined into the attributes Age and Bankruptcy.


Financial Instrument: This category is refined into the attributes Market and
Trading. If a company’s financial instrument is listed in a market segment with low
regulatory requirements, and the company itself has low market capitalization, then
this instrument is seen as an additional indicator of suspiciousness. A change in
trading volume or trading behavior is also seen as suspicious.



News: The user-generated content spread in social communities is closely analyzed
by the model. The attribute News is refined into attributes Content and Sentiment;
the former analyzes whether the web publication includes suspicious phrases (e.g.,
increase in revenue, new product development), and the latter captures the sentiment
expressed within the news.

This input data is provided by the developed services and described in (Grčar, 2012;
Smailović, Žnidaršič, & Grčar, 2012).

3.2 Model Description
Based on further interviews, the attributes structure was transformed into a hierarchical
tree (Alić et al., 2013), with the root node ‘Pump and Dump’ in the following P&D,
based on a qualitative- multi-attribute-method as proposed in (Bohanec & Zupan, 2004),
20
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differentiating between the pure user-generated-content data (News) and the
heterogeneous data regarding the company and related financial instruments
(Comp_FinInst). Hence, the tree consists of the two sub-trees: one for ‘Company’ and
its related financial instrument ‘Comp_FinInst’ and the second one for ‘News’. The
proposed model aggregates the attributes into assessment of pump-and-dump market
manipulation:
CountryBlackList
IndustryBlackList

BlackLists

CompanyBlackList
Age

Company

History

Bankrupt
MarketSegment

Comp_FinInst
Market

MarketCapitalization
TradingVolume

Pump and Dump
(P&D)

FinancialInstrument
Trading

Sentiment

Nb. Of Trades

News

Content

Figure 1: The hierarchical tree of attributes (Alić et al., 2013)

Attribute scales: For each attribute, the qualitative values are scaled in the range from
highly suspicious (red colored) to not suspicious (green colored), where v-low is an
abbreviation for very low, and v-high an abbreviation for very high (Figure 2).

Figure 2: The attribute scales (Alić et al., 2013)
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The scales for each attribute value are defined by the regulatory authority members and
can be reconfigured when in use by the end user.
In our case, for example, the default setting for the attribute ‘Market Capitalization’ is
‘low’ (highly suspicious) if the company’s value is under 5 million (given currency),
‘medium’ if the value is between 5 and 30 million, and ‘high’ (not suspicious) if the
value is greater than 30 million. In the next example the attribute ‘Market Segment’ has
two values ‘no’ and ‘yes’. In this case the value ‘no’ means that the stock is not traded
at the market segment with low regulations. Accordingly, the value ‘yes’ means, that
the stock is traded at the market with low regulations (e.g. OTC market).
Manipulation scheme indicators: Within the predefined timespan the proposed
calculation intends to identify abnormal changes which can be seen as indicators (Eren
& Ozsoylev, 2006; Goldstein & Guembel, 2008; Zaki, Diaz, & Theodoulidis, 2012) for
pump-and-dump abuse. Hence, the suspiciousness is assessed as follows:

Firstly, to assess recent changes in trading, long-and short-term average trading volumes
are computed by taking the monthly and three-day averages of the trading volume:

where TVi is the trading volume of the i-th day; n = 3 days; m = 30 days.

Secondly, to assess recent changes in number of trades, long-and short-term average
trading volumes are computed by taking the monthly and three-day averages of the
trading volume:

where NTi is the number of trades of the i-th day; n = 3 days; m = 30 days.
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Additional indicators for pump-and-dump market manipulation are calculated
accordingly as presented in Table 1.
Name
Sentiment LongTerm Period

Description / Definition
Sentiment of news based on assessment of long-term sentiment.
Based on the overall picture of the mood of the news
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 = (𝑚
𝐼=1 𝑆𝑖 )/𝑚

Sentiment
Short-Term
Period

Sentiment of news based on short-term sentiment (daily). Based
on the overall picture of the mood of the news of one to three days

User-Generated
Content LongTerm Period

Content of news based on assessment of specified terms. Based on
the overall picture of the mood of the news

User-Generated
Content ShortTerm Period

Content of news based on short-term specified terms (daily).
Based on the overall picture of the mood of the news of one to
three days

𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 = (𝑛𝐼=1 𝑆𝑖 )/𝑛

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 = (𝑚
𝐼=1 𝐶𝑖 )/𝑚

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 = (𝑚
𝐼=1 𝐶𝑖 )/𝑛

Table 1: Calculation of average values of the input variables

Thirdly, in order to calculate jumps in e.g. price (Frieder & Zittrain, 2008), the deviation
of the short-term as related to the long-term average is calculated by dividing the shortterm average by the long-term average and multiplying by 100, as presented in Figure 3.
Three cases are assessed: when the short-term value is smaller than, greater than, or
equal to the long-term value. Suspiciousness is assessed using aggregated numerical
input values, which are then mapped according to qualitative scales, as defined by the
problem owner as high, med and low or as v-high, high, med, low, and v-low.

Accordingly, structured data (such as e.g. trading volume) and unstructured data (such
as e.g. user-generated content) are thereby taken into account in order to identify
abnormal changes that may be indicators of pump-and-dump market manipulations. The
recalibration of the indicator values or even the deployment of predefined default values
can be adjusted by the end user.
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Indicators:

Short term
Long term

Low= less than 50%
Med=between 50% and 150%
High= more than 150%

(Short /
Long) *100

V-low = between 0% <and <=3%
Low = between 3%< and <=5%
Medium= between 5%< and <=10%
High= between 10%< and <=15%
V-high= between 15%< and <=100%

Figure 3: Calculation of artificial jumps as decision rules calibration

Output Calculation: The final pump-and-dump alert output value (P&D), is an
aggregation of the lower level attributes Comp_FinInst and News, whereas the
Comp_FinInst aggregates Financial Instrument and the issuing Company. News
aggregates Content and Sentiment of the News regarding the Financial Instrument and
the issuing company. P&D aggregates News and Comp_FinInst and presents the final
indicator which indicates whether a suspicious market situation prevails. The scales
consist of five values representing the decision rules as depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4: P&D alert output aggregation
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For the v-high alert, three possible combinations exist; the alerts ‘high’ and ‘med’ are
respectively defined by seven and eight possible combinations. The alert ‘low’ has six
possible permutations, and the alert ‘v-low’ has one combination.

3.3 User Interface
Initialized by a routine at the end of the day (midnight), the Surveillance System begins
the search for the appearance of user-generated content regarding the monitored
company every day for a predefined time period (e.g., within the last 30 days). For this
purpose, the unstructured data is continuously retrieved, preprocessed by the developed
services, and stored in the database where it can be assessed by the FMS-DSS. The
FMS-DSS subsequently collects other related input data.
Based on end-user defined rules, the output appears as a signal which can be either a vhigh, high, medium, low, or v-low alert. The following figure depicts a detailed view of
alerts as displayed on the end-user screen. This view allows the user to drill down to a
more detailed level for each alert. The related P&D output values are then stored in the
database, enabling the user to post-analyze the suspect alerts.

Figure 5: FMS-DSS prototype

The FMS-DSS user interface depicted in figure 5 consists of a screen showing the listed
‘Alerts’ and ‘Details’ with specific information on each alert.
The warnings listed in the ‘Alerts’ screen provide general information to the end user.
Here, the company name in the list is replaced with an International Securities
Identification Number (ISIN), and the exchange where the security is traded. The screen
also displays the alert number under which the specific alert is stored in the database.
25
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The Date specifies the exact alert date. The user can select an alert from the list to view
more detailed information.
The ‘Details’ screen depicts the alert selected above. Here, the display divides the
information into two parts; the upper part displays unstructured data, and the lower part
displays corresponding structured data.
In the unstructured data area, the graph indicates the appearance of positive (green)
and/or negative (red) news. The yellow line represents the difference between positive
and negative news. In the alert shown in this screen shot, the yellow line appears mostly
in a positive sentiment area and the light blue bars represent the sentiment amount; in
this example, we note the high appearance of sentiment on the 28th and 29th March
2012.
In the structured data, we can see three colored horizontal lines showing the highest
(green), lowest (red), and average (black) of daily stock prices. The dark blue vertical
bars represent trading volume. The alerts, appearing as yellow dots, are evident on the
29th and 30th of March and the 3rd of April 2012.
On the right side of the screen comprises some of the phrases collected from social-net
news that have been used in the calculation of sentiment values; this feature allows the
end user to observe the corresponding text and follow it to its source and author. Also of
the right side of the screen, the Calculation tab contains further information on the
calculation of the P&D output alert.
For the user’s convenience, a history of alerts and the corresponding database ID of the
specific company are also listed. The end user is thus provided with a range of
information to use in the task of financial market monitoring.

4 IT Artifact Evaluation
This section presents an empirical evaluation of the presented FMS-DSS. In particular,
the P&D output data is used for the performance assessment.
This section is organized as follows: first, the data required for the evaluation will be
described; then, after presenting descriptive statistics of this data, the relationship
between the P&D output values and actual observed stock price changes is analyzed.
There are two different sources of unstructured data considered in this dataset: usergenerated content gathered from a variety of financial blogs, and news platforms. The
unstructured input data is preprocessed and stored in a database, which is then assessed
by the other system components as described previously; the data published on
regulatory authority pages is likewise stored as input data in the database.
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Structured financial data is automatically downloaded by the system from a data vendor
(which was involved as one industry partner in the research project), while regulatory
data regarding the blacklist is stored as a list in a database and can be modified by the
end user.
Overall, three different data sources are considered: user-generated content, regulatory
authority data, and stock price data for the period from 01.01.2012 to 03.09.2013. As a
result, the P&D output sample generated by the FMS-DSS consists of 1700 OTC stock
trades, with the corresponding structured and unstructured data containing 118096
entries.

4.1 Descriptive Analysis
The P&D output data is clustered within the five alert groups: very high, high, medium,
low, and very low suspiciousness. The evaluations of suspiciousness in the given
dataset of 118,096 entries are presented in Table 2.
Alert

Count

Percentage

v-high

982

0.83%

High

22215

18.81%

Med

92062

77.96%

Low

2780

2.35%

v-low

57

0.05%

Table 2: Examination of the highest and lowest daily price changes

Statistical analysis reveals prevalent medium- and high-value alerts. This may be
explained by the sensitivity of the model. Certainly the model is developed as a
qualitative model where pre-defined default values might be too receptive. Allowing the
end user to configure their own aggregation rules and set their own thresholds would
therefore allow for improvement in alert sensitivity, to the effect that false positive
alerts can be reduced. The output data presented above already incorporates abnormal
volume changes and other market abuse indicators as defined in previous sections.

4.2 Manipulation Examination
According to the domain experts involved in the research project, v-high and high alerts
are the most relevant situations that demand further investigation. On that account, the
evaluation proceeds by grouping v-high and high alerts into a suspicious class (v-h, h),
and the other alerts into a non-suspiciousness class (m, l, v-l).
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In the literature, significant price changes have been described as an indicator (Hanke &
Hauser, 2008; Zaki et al., 2011) of stock manipulation. In the following, this measure is
applied in order to determine if the developed IT artifact can provide support to detect
potentially suspicious pump-and-dump abuse cases.
In order to evaluate the system’s capability to detect such relevant cases, actual price
changes in situations that were assessed by the system as highly suspicious (v-h, h) are
compared with those that were assessed as less suspicious (m, l, v-l). In doing so, for
each v-high, high, medium, low and v-low P&D output value, the changes between the
highest (pH)
and the lowest (pL) daily stock price at the alert date are calculated.
To assess the changed market price value for the lowest and highest daily prices, the
following measure is calculated:

A hypothesis is thus formulated to verify whether actually observed price changes
related to the (v-h, h) class are significantly higher than the actual price changes related
to the (m, l, v-l) class:

In doing so, and given suitably sized samples (Nv-h, h =23197; Nm,l,v.l=94899) a t-test
is applied to test the formulated hypothesis. The null hypothesis can be rejected at the
1% level. The results are presented in Table 3.
N=118096

Mean

Std. dev.

Median

(v-h, h)

N=23197

1.24

3.65

0.41

(m, l, v-l)

N=94899

0.4

1.46

0

p-value

<0.01

t-value

34.31

Table 3: Evaluation results

Undoubtedly, it appears that focusing on the group of v-high and high alerts is
advantageous, as the t-value is highly significant. Hence, it can be stated that suspicious
abuse cases where fraudsters first buy shares and then attempt to manipulate their price
by spreading extremely euphoric content on social media, can be detected by the
implemented FMS-DSS.
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This statistical evaluation encourages in such a way that the default values as defined by
the practitioners and regulatory authority might be seen as the best default values. A
potential shortcoming from the end-user (e.g. compliance officer in a bank) perspective
might be the huge number of potentially suspicious daily alerts (55 in averages) the
system provides.
In order to reduce the overwhelming number of positive alerts to capture only the most
probable suspect patterns, further refinements might be undertaken by the end user, such
as a threshold routine that calculates the changes between the highest and the lowest
daily stock price. For every price change greater than or equal to a specified percentage,
the routine will trigger an alert.
An examination of such price changes results in a reduced list of 268 alerts, in other
words, about one alert every two days. Thus, the procedure might reduce the noise of
less relevant alerts and pinpoint the most suspicious manipulation cases. It appears that
filtering based on price changes significantly increases the appearance of v-high values
from 0.83% to 23.88% and of high values from 18.81% to 34.33%. The appearance of a
medium alert, however, falls significantly from 77.96% to 41.04%. Hence, the final
procedure will filter the most promising suspect alerts and help reduce their daily
appearance to the lowest reasonable number.

5 Conclusion
This work has documented the effectiveness of the FMS-DSS and the importance of a
market surveillance solution in improving the detection of information-based market
manipulation. It has shown how the regulatory authority can be supported by the use of
a market surveillance service. The evaluation results show that user-generated content
can be utilized in near-real time using the developed FMS-DSS. The P&D alert results
show that the FMS-DSS is able to handle voluminous and heterogeneous data and
provide timely daily alerts by distinguishing suspect and non-suspect market situations.
Most notably, this is the first study that investigates the effectiveness of market
surveillance decision support that considers three different data sources: user-generated
content, data provided by regulatory, and time series data from a data vendor. Our
results provide convincing evidence for a long-term analysis (of approximately two
years) of real data and suggest that the developed artifact may be effective in detecting
real abusive cases of pump-and-dump market manipulation. However, some limitations
are worth noting; even if the research is supported statistically, the artifact has not yet
been evaluated in the real-world conditions of a compliance office. Future research
should therefore include a subsequent effort in order to evaluate the acceptance and use
of the running artifact.
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